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David G. Morgan-Owen. The Fear of Invasion: Strategy, Politics,
and British War Planning, 1880-1914. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2017. Pp. 250.
The past decade has seen a surge in the study of the British
Empire’s grand strategy and war planning before the First World
War. Indeed, historian Matthew Seligmann has gone so far as to
identify the past decade as “The Renaissance of Pre-First World
War Naval History.”1 David Morgan-Owen’s new monograph, The
Fear of Invasion, is an excellent addition to this trend. He tackles a
formidable objective: proving that the threat of attack on the British
Isles had a significant influence on the formation of the British
Empire’s pre-First World War defence policy. To the layperson, this
may seem a simple goal but in doing so, Morgan-Owen is refuting
over sixty years of established historiography. Despite this daunting
goal, Morgan-Owen’s argument and use of evidence will sway both
newcomers to defence studies as well as experienced academics.
For over sixty years, the historiography of the United Kingdom
before the First World War has consistently regarded the prospect
of the British Isles being invaded, and the invasion scares of the
pre-1914 period, as nothing more than a ‘bogey.’2 Many works treat
the invasion issue, particularly the deliberations of the Committee
of Imperial Defence, as purely political: the machination of Army
officers seeking higher budgets, jingoistic conscriptionists, or even
naval officers who sought to bend the British Army to their will.3
Morgan-Owen identifies this gap within the historiography, arguing
that, while political intrigue was an influence, this interpretation
1  
Matthew S. Seligmann, “The Renaissance of Pre-First World War Naval History,”
The Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 3 (2013): 454-79.
2  
The term’s use in academia is most highly attributed to Arthur J. Marder, From
Dreadnought to Scapa Flow - The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919 - Volume
I The Road to War, 1904-1914 (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).
3  
See, for example, Franklyn Arthur Johnson, Defence by Committee: The British
Committee of Imperial Defence 1885-1959 (London: Oxford University Press, 1960);
Samuel R. Williamson Jr., Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare
for War, 1904-1914 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969); Michael Howard,
The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era
of the Two World Wars (London: Temple Smith, 1972); Nicholas d’Ombrain, War
Machinery and High Policy: Defence Administration in Peacetime Britain 19021914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973); and John Gooch, The Plans of War:
The General Staff and British Military Strategy c. 1900-1916 (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1974).
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unjustly brands home defence as having a negligible impact on prewar British strategy. The historiography of British war planning
has been overwhelmingly concerned with the formation of naval and
military offensive war plans against Germany. Morgan-Owen argues
that this has “created a false dichotomy between ‘Continental’ and
‘blue water’ schools,” in which the pre-war period was defined by
cutthroat competition for funding and operational prestige between
the British Army and Royal Navy (p. 4).
Distancing itself from these themes, The Fear of Invasion’s
central objective is detailing the strategic dilemmas facing the British
Empire before the First World War. Buttressed by extensive archival
research, Morgan-Owen argues that the United Kingdom’s pre-war
strategic thinking was primarily defensive. The goal of British leaders
was maintenance of the Empire and of the European status quo. In
turn, Morgan-Owen believes this bred an “unwillingness to discuss
offensive issues” (p. 232). The blame for this, he argues, lies with the
pre-war political leadership who above all desired European peace,
and if not that, hoped “sea power, financial strength, and geographical
isolation would insulate Britain from the most immediate effects of
a European conflict” (p. 6). Rather than coordinating the armed
services into an effective war machine, the politicians reinforced the
‘Continental Commitment’ of sending the British Expeditionary Force
to the aid of France. This decision was one of political expediency
rather than military practicality because, as Morgan-Owen argues,
“beyond the diplomatic imperative to support France, the government
had no concrete conception of how to fight a war against Germany”
(p. 226).
The bulk of the book, and its strongest sections, concerns the
growing strategic predicament faced by the Royal Navy in its war
planning against Germany. Faced with an increasingly strategically
divergent and reticent British Army, the bulk of defensive duties were
thrust upon the Royal Navy. The story of the gradual withdrawal
of the Royal Navy-planned blockade of Germany in the face of
submarines, nautical mines and torpedo craft has frequently been told
before, but Morgan-Owen provides the most radical account yet. Not
only were offensive naval operations sidelined by the establishment of
‘far blockade,’ but as early as 1906, under the leadership of dogmatic
First Sea Lord Jackie Fisher, the fear of German attack on the British
Isles, either purely naval or amphibious, began to dominate Royal
Navy thinking. Drawing upon an impressive quantity of Admiralty
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memorandum, Morgan-Owen illustrates that the reforms in fleet
disposition and coastal patrol all geared towards combating a German
coup de main against Great Britain’s east coast. In doing so, MorganOwen refutes naval historian Andrew Lambert’s revisionist theories
on Royal Navy ‘flotilla defence’ and strategic economic warfare.4
Moreover, Morgan-Owen contends that the Admiralty recognised its
impotence, and it became the primary proponent for readdressing
the divergence in naval and military planning, although it ultimately
failed in bringing about change before August 1914. Thus, the United
Kingdom entered the First World War with only a set of general
principles on defending the Empire.
The conclusion of The Fear of Invasion is reminiscent of David
Lloyd George’s famous quote chronicling the beginning of the First
World War: “The nations backed their machines over the precipice…
not one of them wanted war; certainly not on this scale.”5 David
Morgan-Owen gives credence to Lloyd George’s claim about British
apprehension towards war, but also illustrates that, despite its
obligations, the British Empire did not have an effective war machine
in August 1914. The Fear of Invasion is an important work on a
subject that needed a modern revision. While other historians have
been satisfied with squabbling over the minor minutiae of British
military and naval thinking before the First World War, David
Morgan-Owen offers an innovative and tactful account on the role of
home defence in shaping British strategy.
alexander
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4  
Nicholas A. Lambert, Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution (Columbia: University
of South Carolina, 1999); and Nicholas A Lambert, Planning Armageddon: British
Economic Warfare and the First World War (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 2012).
5  
David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George (London: Ivor Nicholson
& Watson Limited, 1933), 55.
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